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ABSTRACT 
Public key cryptosystems can well become 
void with the advent of incredibly high 
performance quantum computers. The 
underlying principles of these computers 
themselves, namely quantum mechanics, 
provide the solution to the key distribution 
problem. This paper explains how 
cryptography will be benefited from 
quantum mechanics, through a short 
introduction to classical cryptography, and 
the general principles of quantum 
cryptography and the BB84 protocol for key 
distribution. Then we review a modification 
to the BB84 protocol that is logically 
claimed to increase its efficiency. We then 
validate this claim by presenting our 
simulation results for BB84 and its 
improved protocols and show that the 
efficiency of the improved protocol could be 
doubled without undermining the security 
level of BB84 protocol. 
Keywords: Cryptography, BB84 Protocol, 
Quantum Cryptography, Quantum Key 
Distribution. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although public-key cryptosystems, 
especially with large and randomly 
generated keys, are safe within the context 
of current technology, they can well become 
void when incredibly high performance 
quantum computers come into real existence 
and use. A quantum algorithm with 
polynomial time for factorization has 
already been discovered [1], so if quantum 
computers become a reality, RSA and other 
public-key cryptosystems would become 
obsolete. This is where quantum 
cryptography comes to the rescue, offering a 
new solution to the key distribution problem 
by using the quantum mechanics principles. 
Quantum cryptography, better named 
quantum key distribution, allows Alice and 
Bob to create a random secret key based on 
quantum mechanics and to verify that the 
key has not been eavesdropped [2,3,4]. 
Quantum cryptography is based on the 
principles of quantum physics, for example, 
measurement of photon polarization with 
incompatible basis modifies the photon 
polarization. Also one cannot measure 
simultaneously the polarization of a photon 
in the rectilinear and the diagonal bases. 
These facts are the core of quantum key 
distribution protocols. 
Various schemes for quantum cryptography 
have been proposed, such as B92, BB84, 
and EPR [2,4]. For brevity, we will consider 
the well-known scheme BB84. B92 is 
similar to BB84, and EPR exploit quantum 
entanglement. 
 
2. BB84 PROTOCOL 
BB84 protocol was proposed by Bennett 
and Brassard [5]. Between Alice and Bob 
two channels are needed: quantum and 
classical. Alice sends photons to Bob 
through quantum channel. Then they use 
classical channel to agree on the same key 
based on transmitted photons. BB84 
Protocol consists of three steps: raw key 
extraction, key error correction, and privacy 
amplification. Raw key extraction is as 
follows: 
1. Alice sends Bob a sequence of photons 
randomly polarized. 
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2. For each photon, Bob randomly 
chooses rectilinear or diagonal bases to 
measure it. 
3. Bob announces to Alice his bases (but 
not results). 
4. Alice transmits back which 
measurements are done in compatible 
bases. 
5. Alice and Bob throw away photons 
measured in incompatible bases, 
decoding remaining photons to 0 and 1 
that make the raw key. 
 
Their raw keys must be the same if no 
eavesdropping has occurred. So, they 
compare some bits of their raw keys for 
eavesdropping. 
For security analysis [6], let us assume Eve 
eavesdrops and measures a photon. With 
probability 21 , Eve’s measurement is done 
in incompatible basis and modifies the 
photon polarization. Then Bob measures the 
modified photon, and photon polarization 
modifies and with probability 21  become 
different from Alice’s polarization. Thus, 
Alice and Bob’s photon polarization is 
different with probability 4121*21 = . 
This means that the probability of successful 
eavesdropping is 43 . If Eve measures n  
photons, she does not modify their 
polarization with the probability n)43(  that 
goes to zero as n  grows, therefore her 
eavesdropping is detected with near certain 
probability. 
Error may appear in raw key due to noisy 
environment. If raw keys of Alice and Bob 
differ due to environment noise, they must 
remove all differences, producing an error 
free common key. This process is called 
error correction and various schemes could 
be applied [2,3], for example 2D parity 
check scheme. In the scheme, Alice and Bob 
organize their raw keys into 2D square 
matrix and exchange parities of the rows 
and columns. Any row or column that has 
different parities is discarded. To ensure 
privacy, also diagonals of matrix are 
discarded. After error correction, Eve may 
have partial information of the key. Thus 
Alice and Bob need to lower down Eve’s 
information to an arbitrary low value using 
some privacy amplification protocols [2,3]. 
The data rate and transmission length are 
two values of interest for quantum key 
distribution [4,7]. According to quantum bit 
error rate (QBER) and raw key rate, a 
general formula could be deduced for them 
[4,7]. The raw key rate is the product of the 
pulse rate v , the average number of photons 
per pulse µ , the transfer efficiency tη , and 
the detector efficiency dη : 
dtraw vR ηηµ2
1=                                Eq. (1) 
The factor 21  is due to the bases 
incompatibility. The transfer efficiency can 
be expressed as:  
1010
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t
+−=η                                     Eq. (2) 
where fL  is the losses in the fiber in kmdB , l  
is the length of fiber, and BL  is internal 
losses at Bob in dB . 
Two factors may cause errors in raw key, 
imperfect detector and dark count. Imperfect 
detector introduce optrawopt pRR =  errors in 
raw key where optp  is the probability of 
wrong detection of polarization. 
darkpvR 41det =  errors arise from dark count 
(photon detection when there are no 
photons) where darkp  is the probability to 
get a dark count. The QBER is defined as 
the ratio of wrong bits to total received bits: 
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                                                            Eq. (3) 
Tancevski [7] has estimated the fraction of 
bits lost due to error correction as:  
)log( 227
QBER
ec QBERr −=                   Eq. (4) 
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and the fraction of bits lost due to privacy 
amplification as: 
)
2
441(
2
2
log1
QBERQBER
par
−+
+=                   Eq. (5) 
So the final bit rate is: 
rawpaecfinal RrrR )1)(1( −−=                 Eq. (6) 
As transmission length l  increases, transfer 
efficiency tη falls rapidly down, which in 
turn causes more errors in raw key and a 
decrease in the final bit rate to zero. So the 
maximum transmission length could be 
computed.  
The first experimental demonstration of 
quantum key distribution was performed in 
1989 over 30 cm in air [5]. Since then, the 
field has progressed remarkably. At Los 
Alamos National Laboratories, secret key 
have been transmitted in optical fiber over 
67 km [8], and up to 10 km in free space [9]. 
One of the main drawbacks of quantum 
cryptography though is that it provides no 
mechanism for authentication. Some 
drawbacks such as limited distance and 
limited data rate are technological and must 
be solved before quantum cryptography can 
be used widely in the market [10]. 
 
3. IMPROVED BB84 
Since Alice and Bob choose the two bases 
with the same probability, the probability of 
Alice and Bob’s basis compatibility is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2121212121 =+ , so half of the photons 
are thrown away. Ardehali et al. [11] has 
proposed an improvement that decreases 
discarded photons, thereby increasing the bit 
rate of the protocol. The basic idea is that 
Alice and Bob choose the two bases with 
different probabilities, rectilinear basis with 
probability α  and diagonal basis with 
probability α−1 , so they choose the same 
basis with probability:  
22 )1( ααα −+=P                                Eq. (7) 
which goes to 1 as α  goes to zero. This 
means that Alice and Bob’ bases of almost 
all photons are the same, so the bit rate of 
protocol could be doubled. 
 
With the modification, the probability of 
choosing diagonal basis for a photon is:  
22
2
)1(
)1(
αα
α
−+
−                                 Eq. (8) 
which goes to 1 as α  goes to zero, so bases 
of almost all photons are diagonal and 
protocol could be defeated because Eve can 
use the diagonal basis and measures 
polarization of many photons without 
modifying them and causes a few error. To 
prevent the attack, error estimation is 
refined. In contrast to the BB84 protocol, 
which estimates a single error rate, two error 
rates 21 , ee  are estimated in the refined 
protocol: 1e  when Eve uses diagonal basis 
while Alice and Bob use rectilinear basis, 
and 2e  when Eve uses rectilinear basis 
while Alice and Bob use diagonal basis. The 
final error rate is the maximum of 21 , ee . 
Now if Eve measures photons along the 
diagonal basis, although 2e  is zero, 1e  
increase (about 50%), so the final error is 
high and eavesdropping is detected. 
 
Let us assume Eve measures each photon 
along the rectilinear basis with 
probability 1p , along the diagonal basis with 
probability 2p , and does not measure with 
probability 211 pp −− . If Alice and Bob use 
the rectilinear basis and Eve uses the 
diagonal basis, Alice and Bob’s polarization 
is different with probability 21 , so 221 pe =  
because Eve chooses diagonal basis with the 
probability 2p . Similarly, 212 pe = . Note 
that 21 , ee  are independent of the value of 
α  and only depend on Eve’s eavesdropping 
strategy, so the improved protocol is as 
secure as BB84 protocol. Although smaller 
α  leads to higher bit rate, it leads to fewer 
rectilinear polarized photons and if number 
of rectilinear polarized photons is too few, 
1e  could not be accurate. Thus according to 
the number of total photons, the appropriate 
value of α  must be adapted. 
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4. SIMULATION OF IMPROVED BB84 
In this section, we present simulation results 
of BB84 and its improved protocols that 
include comparing efficiency and security. 
Efficiency means key bit rate and security 
means raw key error rate vs. eavesdropping 
rate. 
We simulate quantum channel and photon 
transfer, implement error estimation, error 
correction, and privacy amplification. Also 
we simulate Eve’s eavesdropping when we 
evaluate security of protocols. We simulate 
nm1300  fiber optic that its loss 
is kmdBBL 35.0= . In the nm1300  
wavelength, the efficiency of photon 
detector is 20.0=dη  and the probability of 
dark count is 510−=darkp . Loss at photon 
detector BL  and error due to imperfect 
detector optQBER  are ignored because their 
values are small. The average number of 
photons per pulse is 1.0=µ  and 710  pulses 
were used in the simulation. 10% of raw key 
were compared in the error estimation. We 
have used a 10*10 matrix for error 
correction and repeated error correction 
process until no error found. We repeated 
the simulation 100 times and deduced the 
results according them, so we think that 
results are reliable. 
Three different values were chosen for 
efficiency comparison: )02.0,15.0,50.0( . 
As mentioned before, the probability of 
Alice and Bob’s basis compatibility is 
22 )1( ααα −+=P  so: 
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Simulation results shown in Figure 1 
validate the same conclusion:  the ratio of 
bit rate with 15.0=α  to the bit rate with 
50.0=α (original BB84) is almost 1.5, and 
also the bit rate with 15.0=α  to the bit 
rate with 50.0=α (original BB84) is almost 
1.9. 
For security comparison, the raw key error 
rate vs. eavesdropping rate was computed, 
as shown in Figure 2. The curves for 
different values of α  are similar. This 
means that any detectable eavesdropping in 
BB84 protocol is detectable in the improved 
protocol. We assume Eve could determine 
pulses that have more than a photon, 
measure a photon of the pulse and send 
remaining photons of the pulse to Bob, so 
her eavesdropping is not detectable. 
However 5% of non-empty pulses have 
more than a photon and Eve couldn’t devise 
successful attack. Also we assumed Eve 
choose two bases with the same probability. 
 
 
Figure 1: Efficiency vs. transmission length of 
BB84 and its improved protocols 
 
 
Figure 2: Error rate vs. eavesdropping rate of 
BB84 and its improved protocols 
Eve could choose the bases with different 
probabilities; the simulation results of this 
Estimated Error 
Eavesdropping Percent 
Bit Rate 
Distance 
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behavior are shown in Figure 3. We chose 
three values for eavesdropping (10%, 50%, 
and 100%) and for each value, the raw key 
error rate vs. eavesdropping rate were 
computed. Choosing two bases with the 
same probability, results in a detectable 
minimum error rate. 
 
 
Figure 3: Error rate vs. diagonal bases percent 
of BB84 and its improved protocols 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Quantum cryptography offers a new 
solution to the key distribution problem. Its 
security is based on principles of quantum 
mechanics. BB84 is a protocol for key 
distribution using these principles, but with 
the deficiency of losing half of the photons 
when different bases are used. We have 
reviewed an available refinement to BB84 
protocol that could logically increase its 
efficiency. The refinement involves using 
rectilinear and diagonal bases with different 
probabilities. We have simulated the BB84 
and its refined version and have shown facts 
and figures that in comparison with the 
BB84, the efficiency of the refined protocol 
could be almost doubled without affecting 
the security of BB84.  
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